A man no-one had ever heard of before--china bronze sculpture

 Some other names from outside S.I.S. had to be added to the list: Peter Teleborian, psychiatrist Lars Faulsson, locksmith Teleborian had been hired by S.I.S. as a psychiatric consultant on specific cases in the late '80s and early '90s - on three occasions, to be exact, and Edklinth had examined the reports in the archive. The first had been extraordinary - Counter-Espionage had identified a Russian informer inside the Swedish telecom industry, and the spy's background indicated that he might be inclined to suicide in the event that his actions were exposed.
Teleborian had done a strikingly good analysis, which helped them turn the informer so that he could become a double agent. His other two reports had involved less significant evaluations: one was of an employee inside S.I.S. who had an alcohol problem, and the second was an analysis of the bizarre sexual behaviour of an African diplomat. Neither Teleborian nor Faulsson - especially not Faulsson - had any position inside S.I.S. And yet through their assignments they were connected to … to what? The conspiracy was intimately linked to the late Alexander Zalachenko, the defected G.R.U. agent who had apparently turned up in Sweden on Election Day in 1976.
A man no-one had ever heard of before. How was that possible? Edklinth tried to imagine what reasonably would have happened if he had been sitting at the chief's desk at S.I.S. in 1976 when Zalachenko defected. What would he have done? Absolute secrecy. It would have been essential. The defection could only be known to a small group without risking that the information might leak back to the Russians and … How small a group? An operations department? An unknown operations department? If the affair had been appropriately handled, Zalachenko's case should have ended up in Counter-Espionage. Ideally he should have come under the auspices of the military intelligence service, but they had neither the resources nor the expertise to run this sort of operational activity. So, S.I.S. it was. But Counter-Espionage had not ever had him. Bj?rck was the key; he had been one of the people who handled Zalachenko.
And yet Bj?rck had never had anything to do with Counter-Espionage. Bj?rck was a mystery. Officially he had held a post in the Immigration Division since the '70s, but in reality he had scarcely been seen in the department before the '90s, when suddenly he became assistant director. And yet Bj?rck was the primary source of Blomkvist's information. How had Blomkvist been able to persuade Bj?rck to reveal such explosive material? And to a journalist at that. Prostitutes. Bj?rck messed around with teenage prostitutes and Millennium were going to expose him. Blomkvist must have blackmailed Bj?rck. Then Salander came into the picture.